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PURPOSE OF THE COMMENT
Introduction
Commentaries regarding § 621(a)(2) of the Cable Act of 1984'
provide an overview of the status of the Act as interpreted in vari-
ous circuit and state court decisions.2 Although these overviews
* BA , 1992, University of California, Davis; J.D., expected May 1997,
University of Miami School of Law. The author would like to thank Professor Taylor
Mattis for her ideas and guidance, and Julia Ansel for her support.
1. Sec. 621(a)(2) is codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (1995).
2. Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Provision of
Cable Act Allowing Cable Companies Access to Utility Easments on Private Property,
113 A.L.R. Fed. 523 (1992); Frank W. Lloyd, Cable Competition with SMATV/
MMDS/Overbuilders: Access by Franchised Cable Operators to Private Apartment
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are helpful to the practicing attorney, they do not assist a student,
or a court for that matter, to understand a prominent flaw within
the reasoning of the majority of decisions when § 621(a)(2) is in
question.3 In fact, they overlook the very topic to be discussed
herein.4 By providing a right of access to certain easements and
rights-of-way for cable franchisees, the Act creates a takings issue
wherein a determination must be made regarding the scope of
access contemplated by § 621(a)(2).5
Dwellings or Single Family Development, P.L.I. (1992); Jean G. Howard, Real
Property Issues in CATV Use of Public Rights of Way and Easements, 23 URB. LAw.
413 (1991). These annotations predated important decisions critiqued herein which
were not published until 1993.
One note published in 1995 was styled similarly to Donaldson's in that it solely
reviewed the current scope of access allowed by courts; however, it, too, did not
engage in the critical analysis discussed herein. Deborah C. Costlow, Access-to-
Premises Litigation Under Federal, State and Local Law, 405 P.L.IJPat. 1111 (1995).
3. The general purpose of the Cable Act of 1984 is to establish a national policy
concerning cable communications by creating franchise procedures that encourage
the growth and development of cable systems. The Act also seeks to assure that cable
communications provide a diversity of information sources and services to the public
and promote competition in cable communications by minimizing regulations that
would impose an undue economic burden on cable systems.
The pertinent sections of the 1984 act state:
§ 541. General Franchise Requirements
(a) Authority to award Franchises; public rights-of-way and easements;
equal access to service; time for provision of service; assurances.
(2) Any franchise shall be construed to authorize the construction of a
cable system over public rights-of-way, and through easements,
which is within the area to be served by the cable system and
which have been dedicated for compatible uses, except that in
using such easements the cable operator shall ensure -
(A) that the safety, finctioning, and appearance of the property
and the convenience and safety of other persons not adversely
affected by the installation or construction of facilities
necessary for a cable system;
(B) that the cost of the installation, construction, operation, or
removal of such facilities be borne by the cable operator or
subscriber, or a combination of both; and
(C) that the owner of the property be justly compensated by the
cable operator for any damages caused by the installation,
construction, operation, or removal of such facilities by the
cable operator.
47 U.S.C. § 541 (1995).
4. Donaldson, supra, note 1 (The annotator states the purpose of the note is to
address the constitutional validity of the Act. However, the author is of the view that
if "[the term 'dedicated' is seen as referring to any utility easement, and not just
'public' ones, then to be constitutional, [the Act] must also contemplate just
compensation of the owner." The preceding statement includes the same, inherent
flaw existent in the majority of the circuits' interpretations of the Fifth Amendment.
5. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 at Title I § 301 reforms the Cable Act
but does not affect the issue to be discussed herein. Because the Act of 1996 has the
[Vol. 13:257
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The Cable Act of 1984
The Cable Act of 1984 provides cable owners franchised by
local authorities a right of access to public rights-of-way and "dedi-
cated" easements that are necessary to construct cable systems.6
Congress stated in hearings that in drafting the Cable Act it rec-
ognized the Supreme Court's decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.7 Congress stated, however, that Loretto
stuck down "a state statute affording cable operators access to
premises on the grounds that there was no provision in this stat-
ute for granting affected property owners just compensation for
the use of their property."8 In its committee report, the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce specifically stated:
Subsection 621(a)(2) specifies that any franchise issued to a
cable system authorizes the construction of a cable system
over public rights-of-way, and through easements, which
have been dedicated to compatible uses. This would include,
for example, an easement or right-of-way dedicated for elec-
tric, gas or other utility transmission. Such use is subject to
the standards set forth in section 633(b)(1)(A), (B) and (C).
Consideration should also be given to the terms and condi-
tions under which other parties with rights to such ease-
ments and rights-of-way make use of them. Any private
arrangements which seek to restrict a cable system's use of
such easements or rights-of-way which have been granted to
other utilities are in violation of this section and not
enforceable.9
The Act and Takings Law
The takings issue created by the Act is squarely presented
with the interpretation of the scope of access intended to be pro-
vided to CATV operators. Clearly, a right of access to particular
potential of creating additional demands for access to property by the
telecommunications industry the problem to be addressed may ultimately be
exacerbated if the Constitution is misapplied in the future cases as it has been here.
6. Cable Holdings of Ga. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 988 F.2d 1071
(11th Cir. 1993) (TIoflat, C.J., dissenting).
7. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
8. H.R. REP. No. 934 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 80-81 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.CA.N. 4655, 4717-18.
9. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 59, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C-.AN.
4655, 4696. Compare the last sentence of this statement to Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) where the Court held that the government's infringement
on the right of a property owner to exclude others from accessing her property results
in a taking, discussed infra, note 83.
1995-1996]
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"rights-of-way" and certain "easements" is permitted. 10 The area
of great contention throughout the circuits remains whether
access to the interior of the dwellings situated on the property is
allowed through "private" easements" which are not dedicated for
public use. 12 For example, are CATV franchisees precluded from
following telephone lines into each dwelling in order to provide
services where those easements are "private," i.e. made between
the telephone company and landowner, even after they have used
"public rights-of-way" to gain access through the streets and up to
the dwelling? Mere logic suggests that traversing the property
without access through a "compatible" telephone or utility "pri-
vate" easement into the dwelling makes the first action purpose-
less. Surely, Congress did not intend for cable operators to lay
wires across the country through public or "dedicated" easements
only to be denied access into dwellings to actually deliver services.
This, unfortunately, is currently the condition in the CATV indus-
try, due primarily to a poor understanding of takings law by
courts and Congress.
Courts have avoided answering the takings issue presented
by premising their decisions on the grounds that if the Act pro-
vides access in the latter situations without expressly providing
just compensation, the Act is unconstitutional. These courts say
the Act limits access to property dedicated for "public" use. 13 The
decisions are premised on the incorrect belief that just compensa-
10. "Right-of-way" is used to describe a right belonging to a party to pass over
land of another; as used with reference to the right to pass over another's land, it is
only an easement and the grantee acquires only a right to reasonable and usual
enjoyment of the easement with the landowner retaining rights and benefits of
ownership consistent with an easement. Thus, all rights-of-way are easements but
not all easements are rights-of-way. Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler, 177 N.W.2d
786, 789 (Minn. 1970); Bouche v. Wagner, 293 P.2d 203, 209 (Ore. 1956) (en banc);
Howard, supra, note 1, (discussing how these definitions appear in the context of the
Act).
11. The Act contemplates "easements in gross" which are created to benefit their
holder personally and are not connected with any ownership of the land, such as those
made to utility companies or for street easements. ROoER A. CUN-NGHAM wr AL., THE
LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.2 (3d ed. 1984).
12. A "dedication" is "[ I transfer of an interest in land from a private owner to
the public generally or to a public body, such as a municipal corporation." ROGER A.
CuNNiNGImd r AL., supra note 11, at § 11.6.
The issue stated can be found in Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate
Fund VI, Ltd., 953 F.2d 600, 603 (l1th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 182 (1992),
reh'g denied, 988 F.2d 1071 (per curiam).
13. Among these many decisions are most notably, Cable Inv. v. Wooley, 867
F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1989); Cable Holdings, 953 F.2d at 600; Media General Cable of
Fairfax, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condo. Council of Co-Owners, 737 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Va.
1990), affd, 991 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1993).
[Vol. 13:257
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tion for a private taking authorized by the government must be
expressly provided in the legislation and that the Act, in subsec-
tion (2)(c), does not provide just compensation for a taking but
merely for damages incurred during installation or removal over
"public" rights-of-way or easements. 14 Therefore, these cases hold
that allowing access to "private" easements would render the Act
unconstitutional. 15 The failure of these courts to acknowledge the
self-executing nature of the Just Compensation Clause can be
traced primarily to a poor reading of Loretto. This approach to the
Act - in an effort to avoid addressing a constitutional issue or to
avoid construing the Act in an unconstitutional manner - actu-
ally addresses a constitutional issue, albeit wrongly."6 Because of
this initial flaw on a crucial point in takings law, the circuits
employ judicial tools of statutory construction and canons of inter-
pretation to "avoid" a constitutional issue.1 7 Again, the circuits'
interpretation leave a possible scenario where a CATV operator
gains access to the property adjacent to an apartment dwelling via
public easements but is prohibited from entering dwelling units
via telephone or utility easements, even though these easements
appear to be compatible with television cable. Such an interpreta-
tion frustrates the purpose of the Act. In light of the increase of
demands for access likely to result from the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, these errors will frustrate that Act, too.
In writing this comment, I will focus on the flawed reasoning
by the circuits in their interpretation of § 621(a)(2) of the Act and
misapplication of Loretto. The comment will not include an exten-
sive listing of every decision dealing with the Act; however, per-
suasive arguments from courts and judges who exhibit an
understanding of the self-executing nature of the Fifth Amend-
ment will, of course, be highlighted. To follow is a brief explana-
14. See cases cited supra note 13.
15. See cases cited supra note 13.
16. These courts state that the Act must be interpreted in this manner to avoid
addressing a constitutional issue. However in Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985),
Justice White, concurring in the judgment, exposed the weakness of the canon to
avoid constitutional issues when he stated that the canon "amounts to no more than a
preference for implicitly deciding constitutional questions without explaining [the
reasoning]." Furthermore, Judge Friendly stated in Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the
Reading of Statutes, Benchmarks, that use of the rule to avoid constitutional
questions is really just "constitutional nonadjudication."
17. It would be better for the courts interpreting the Cable Act to address the
takings issue and find the Act unconstitutional than use the rule to avoid
constitutional issues and construe the Act and takings law incorrectly. Invalidation
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tion of the self-executing nature of the Just Compensation Clause,
a discussion of Loretto and, finally, critical analysis of the primary
circuit court decisions and the judicial tools employed by these
courts to reach their conclusions."8
THE JUST COMPENSATION CLAUSE
Through the Constitution, the United States government is
given "police powers" to regulate land use. Federal regulation is
limited by the "due process" and "taking" clauses of the Fifth
Amendment 9 and as states are limited by the Fifth Amendment
as made applicable to the them through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.20 Landowners frequently challenge government land use
regulations by claiming a "taking of private property without just
compensation." Thus, a landowner who seeks relief under the
Fourteenth Amendment really is asserting that the government
has violated her substantative due process.
21
Often, the remedy sought by the landowner who challenges
land use regulations as amounting to taking without just compen-
sation is the invalidation of the regulations. 22 Courts, however,
began to offer the landowner the alternative remedy of just com-
pensation for a successful challenge.23 Soon, thereafter, the
Supreme Court adopted the proposition that the Fourteenth
Amendment mandates just compensation as a remedy for a land-
owner's action against a governmental regulatory taking.2
18. Other courts of appeal have addressed the issue, but have relied, almost
exclusively, on the decisions to be discussed herein. Therefore, to avoid redundancy
in the arguments presented, each circuit will not be separately reviewed. Of course,
where the circuits not addressed herein rely on the decisions critiqued, the same
analysis is applicable. Compare Century Southwest Cable TV, Inc., v. CIIF Assoc., 33
F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 1994); TCI of N. D., Inc. v. Schriock Holding Co., 11 F.3d 812 (8th
Cir. 1993).
19. The pertinent portion of the amendment states: "No person shall . .. be
deprived or life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONsr. AMEND. V.
20. "[NIor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. .. ." U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1. Thus, the states' power to
regulate land use is limited, too.
21. ROGER A. CuNNINGHAM ET AL., supra, note 11 at § 9.20.
22. William D. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings and Due Process, 37 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 1057 (1980).
23. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 146 Cal Rptr. 103 (App.
1978), rev'd on remand without published opinion, 4 Civ. No. 16297 (filed June 25,
1979), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
24. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 US 621, 653 (1984).
[Vol. 13:257
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What Constitutes a Taking?
In Loretto, the Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of
a New York statute which provided that a landowner was
required to permit a cable company to install CATV equipment
upon its property and that the landowner may not demand pay-
ment from the company in excess of an amount determined as rea-
sonable by a state commission. The Court held that the statute
equalled a taking of the landowner's property and thus the land-
owner was entitled to just compensation under the Fifth Amend-
ment, as made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In Loretto, the cable company installed a TV cable and a
crossover box on the apartment complex. The crossover box on the
roof was secured by bolts into the masonry of the building.
Although the total surface area affected was minimal, the Court
was steadfast in its holding that any permanent physical occupa-
tion of real property is a taking.2 5 Citing Penn Central, Marshall
stated that "a taking may more readily be found when the inter-
ference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion
by government, then when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good."26
25. In Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) the Court
noted that no set formula existed to determine when a taking had occurred and that
the court must engage in an "ad hoc" inquiry. Among the factors to be considered
were the economic impact of the regulation, the character of the governmental action
and the degree of interference with investment backed expectations.
However, for the purpose of the Cable Act - when physical invasion "reaches the
extreme form of a permanent physical occupation... the character of the government
action is determinative" in finding the action works a taking. Justice Marshall noted
that "[Penn Central] does not repudiate the rule that a permanent physical occupation
is a government action of such a unique character that it is a taking without regard to
other factors that a court might ordinarily examine." Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427, 432
(alteration in original).
26. Furthermore, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) the
Court held that the government imposition of a servitude denied the landowner his
right to exclude others from accessing his property. This imposition amounted to a
physical invasion of the privately owned property. See discussion, infra note 81, on
the Act's prohibition of private agreements that prohibit a CATV operator's access to
compatible easements, which, like Kaiser Aetna, is a taking by means of a government
infringement on a landowner's right to exclude others from his property.
See e.g.,United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946); Portsmouth Co. v.
Untied States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) (holding that even if the government's physical
invasion only covers an easement, compensation must still be paid).
1995-19961
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Self-executing Nature of the Just Compensation Clause
Mechanics of the Amendment
The Just Compensation Clause requires compensation when
a taking occurs and "statutory recognition [of the obligation to pro-
vide just compensation] is not necessary." 27 The promise to pay
when a taking occurs need not be express. It is implied because
the duty to pay is required, automatically, by the Fifth Amend-
ment.28 In essence, "[the Just Compensation Clause] does not
prohibit taking private property, but instead places a condition on
the exercise of that power."29 The Court has plainly stated that
the amendment is not a limitation on the government but a vehi-
cle to ensure compensation in the case where government interfer-
ence amounts to a taking.3 0 When compensation has not been
paid by the government, of course, the Court has the option to
invalidate the regulation."
Effect of the Self-executing Nature on Government
Ordinances
In First English, the landowner, a church, brought an action
of inverse condemnation against the City of Los Angeles for the
"temporary" taking of its land due to an ordinance which pre-
vented the church from building along a stream. After addressing
the issue of "temporary " and "permanent" takings, the Court
addressed the City's contention that requiring compensation for
denial of all use of land prior to invalidation of the ordinance is
inconsistent with prior takings decisions which had held that in
condemnation proceedings a taking does not occur until compen-
sation is calculated and paid. The Court distinguished the situa-
tions, stating:
[Tihese cases [the prior decisions] merely stand for the unex-
ceptional proposition that the valuation of property which
has been taken must be calculated as of the time of the tak-
27. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1943).
28. Id. at 16.
29. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L. A.,
482 U.S. 304 (1987).
30. Id. at 305; see e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
31. See Duquesnce Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299,308 (1989) (holding that if
a regulated utility's rate does not provide adequate compensation, the State has
effectuated a taking without paying just compensation and thus violated the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments); see also, Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
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ing .... The preliminary activity did not work a taking. It
would require a considerable extension of these decisions to
say that no compensable regulatory taking may occur until a
challenged ordinance has ultimately been held invalid. 32
In fact, this is an illustration of the self-executing nature of the
amendment. A negation of the Court's statement indicates that if
compensation were not required when the taking occurs, then
there would be no taking until the ordinance was declared invalid.
Therefore, in First English, the Court remanded the action to
determine if the ordinance effectuated a taking and if so, what
compensation was due, regardless of the fact that the ordinance
did not expressly provide for just compensation.33 The Court
stated, "Once a court has determined that a taking has occurred,
the government retains the whole range of options already avail-
able - amendment of the regulation, withdrawl of the invalidated
regulation, or exercise of eminent domain."3 4
It is important to remember that this reasoning in First Eng-
lish is based on Loretto, where, in 1982, the Court did not hold the
New York statute invalid but merely remanded the case to deter-
mine what compensation was due. In Loretto, the ordinance con-
tained a section on damages which did not expressly provide for
compensation in regards to a taking.3 5 The section closely resem-
bled the Cable Act's damage section at § 621(a)(2)(C), where the
32. 482 U.S. at 307.
33. 482 U.S. at 309; see also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 450 U.S. at 654 ("The
just compensation requirement in the Fifth Amendment is not precatory: once there is
a taking,' compensation must be awarded."). Cf. Geoffrey L. Harrison, Comment, The
Endangered Species Act and Ursine Usurpations: A Grizzly Tale of Two Takings, 58
U. Cm. L. REv. 1101, 1107-08 (1991) ("The Takings Clause does not direct courts to
invalidate legislation on the grounds that the legislation has disproportionate impact;
it requires only that compensation be paid. The legislation remains valid and
effective.").
34. 482 U.S. at 308.
35. The New York law provides:
1. No landlord shall
a. interfere with the installation of cable television facilities upon his
property or premises, except that a landlord may require:
i. that the installation of cable television facilities conform to
such reasonable conditions as are necessary to protect the
safety, functioning and appearance of the premises, and the
convenience and well being or other tenants;
ii. that the cable television company or the tenant or a
combination thereof bear the entire cost of the installation,
operation or removal os such facilities; and that the cost of the
installation, construction, operation, or removal of such
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language indicates payment for damage to the property as a result
of installation and not for a taking.36 As stated, the Court did not
find the placing of cable wires and transfer boxes impermissible.
The Court merely required that just compensation be paid for the
permanent physical occupation of the landlord's premises. 37 Fur-
thermore, the Court did not invalidate the New York law because
of its failure to expressly provide just compensation. Again, this is
because the amendment is self-executing - compensation must
be paid for any taking.
To follow is a critical analysis of the judicial tools employed by
various circuits of the United States' courts of appeal. The issues
addressed for each respective case were selected because: (1) the
courts in that case placed great weight on these tools and tech-
niques; (2) the circuits share ideas in interpreting the Act, includ-
ing tools of statutory construction; and, (3) the theory of the note
is more easily comprehended when the vast array of tools used by
the judiciary in statutory construction are coupled with courts
actually using such tools as opposed to discussing the tools in the
abstract.
JURISPRUDENTIAL TECHNIQUES OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
OF APPEAL
A Plain Language Interpretation of the Act.
A plain language interpretation of the Act creates serious
problems. The pertinent sections of the Act state:
(a) Authority to award Franchises; public rights-of-way and
easements; equal access to service; time for provision of ser-
vice; assurances.
(2) Any franchise shall be construed to authorize the con-
struction of a cable system over public rights-of-way, and
through easements, which is within the area to be served by
the cable system and which have been dedicated for compati-
iii. that the cable television company agree to indemnify the
landlord for any damage caused by the installation, operation
or removal of such facilities that the owner of the property be
justly compensated by the cable operator for any damages
caused by the installation, construction, operation, or removal
of such facilities by the cable operator.
N. Y. ExEc. LAw § 828 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82).
36. supra note 3.
37. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
[Vol. 13:257
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ble uses, except that in using such easements the cable oper-
ator shall ensure:
38
Apparently § 621(a)(2) is a legislative compromise and the
final result is a poorly worded statute. The section begs the ques-
tion of whether "public" modifies "rights-of-way" and "easements"
and whether "easements" refers solely to other "easements of com-
patible uses," such as telephone lines. Courts commonly employ
canons of statutory construction to determine the meaning of stat-
utes. One such canon, the rule to avoid surplusage holds that no
phrase should be construed to be redundant and that every word
and phrase adds something to the statutory command.,3 9 Apply-
ing this canon to § 621(a)(2) illustrates that easements are not
limited by the word "public." If "public" was applicable to "ease-
ments" then the phrase "over public rights-of-way, and through
[public] easements... "is redundant. This is because rights-of-
way, "as used with reference to the right to pass over another's
land . . ." takes only the form of an easement.40 Therefore, the
phrase would be stating "over public rights-of-way [easements]
and through [public] easements ... ." Furthermore, "dedicated"
must mean designated or devoted to - as defined in its ordinary
usage - because easements for telephone wires and other "compat-
ible uses" are not always in the form of easements which have
been formally "dedicated" for "public use."4 1
Also, § 621(a)(2)(C) creates the issue of whether the Act does
expressly provide just compensation.4 2 None of the circuit courts
have found that it does but some district courts take a different
position from the circuits in regard to this subsection.4 3
In Media General Cable of Fairfax, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condo.
Council of Co-Owners, the majority made a textual argument for
supporting the position that § 621(a)(2) solely authorizes a CATV
franchisee to use public lands, in the form of public rights-of-way
38. 47 U.S.C. § 541 (1995).
39. E.g., Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988); Exxon Corp. v.
Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 369 n.14 (1986).
40. Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler, 177 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Minm. 1970).
41. Dedicated, in its ordinary usage is defined as "[tlo set apart for or devote to a
special purpose; to devote wholly or chiefly." WEBSTER'S NEW DICTIoNARY, 153
(Concise Ed. 1990).
42. Supra note 3.
43. See Cable Holdings of Ga., v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI Ltd., 678 F.Supp.
871 (N.D. Ga. 1986); see also Greater Worcester Cablevision, Inc. v. Carabetta
Enters., Inc., 682 F.Supp. 1244, 1258 (D. Mass. 1985).
1995-1996]
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and easements that have been expressly dedicated to public use."
In Media General, the CATV franchisee brought a declaratory
action under § 621(a)(2) of the Act seeking a declaration that it
was entitled to install cable wires in "compatible easements" on
the landowner's condominium common areas. Both the district
court and Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the
Act does not permit a franchisee access to private utility ease-
ments to reach separate dwellings nor authorize or provide just
compensation for such a taking. At the appellate level, the major-
ity relied on the legal definitions of "dedicate" and "dedication" to
hold that "dedicated," as used in the statute, has a more narrow
and legally different definition from its ordinary usage.4 5 The
court found that Congress intended to use the technical, legal
terms since the statute addressed real property issues.4 6 Based
on this premise, the court concluded that reading the phrase "over
public rights-of-way, and through easements, which.., have been
dedicated for compatible uses" is "more consistent" when "dedi-
cated" is given its legal definition than when "dedicated" includes
private easements where rights-of-way are set aside for the pub-
lic. 47 The circuits' plain meaning interpretations lead to an
absurd result which cannot be enforced by courts.48
Oddly, a proper reading of takings law combined with this
textual argument leads to a result the court seeks to avoid -
addressing a constitutional issue. Because of the court's misun-
derstanding of takings law, it must make this textual argument or
find the Act unconstitutional, since its position is that the Act does
not expressly provide just compensation and the same must be
expressly provided for the legislation to be valid. Notice, however,
that if the court properly employs takings jurisprudence, that is,
to allow for the fact that a taking may be authorized by the Act
without express just compensation due to the self-executing
nature of the Just Compensation Clause, an application of the
44. 991 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1993).
45. Compare supra note 34 to supra notes 7,9.
46. The court cited Corming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 201 (1974),
for the proposition that where Congress uses technical words, or terms of art, those
words should be construed according to the art or science involved. But cf. United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981) (alluding that canons of interpretation
are just aids to determining meaning and are not ironclad rules.) Thus, if a statute
indicates a meaning contrary to (the canonsl presumptions, they [canons] have no
value.
47. 991 F.2d at 1173.
48. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'n., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (holding that
the Court must look past the plain meaning interpretation of a statute when such
interpretation leads to an absurd result).
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ordinary meaning of "dedicated" does not make the statute uncon-
stitutional, it merely provides for a taking. Thus, it could be
argued that a correct application of takings law combined with the
majority's plain meaning interpretation of the Act leads to an
absurd result.4 9 A court making a proper application of the Fifth
Amendment could not construe the Act as did the majority in
Media General.
Judge Kaufman, dissenting in Media General, took the more
tenable position both that the Act does contemplate a taking and
that the text supports such a position. Judge Kaufman explains
that the Act contains the limiting language of "public rights-of-
way."50 This phrase would limit a CATV franchisee to solely the
right to "pass over" the owner's property through easements
already set aside for the public.5' Judge Kaufman also notes that
"public" does not appear in relation to "easements" nor within
"dedicated for compatible uses." Furthermore, by applying the
ordinary use of "dedicated", which is synonymous with "desig-
nated" or "granted," Judge Kaufman held that "easements" are
not limited to "public easements" and that § 621(a)(2) therefore
considers private easements.5 2 This interpretation would find
that the CATV operator accessing private compatible easements
would be involved in a taking requiring just compensation.5 3
The Third Circuit's Reliance on Legislative History5"
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit looked to § 633 of
the Act, which was proposed and rejected, to reach the conclusion
that the Act could not provide mandatory access through private
49. See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1983) (refusing to employ the specialized
meaning of a word if doing so leads to an absurd result).
50. 991 F.2d at 1176.
51. This is because all rights-of-way are easements, supra note 7.
52. 991 F.2d at 1176. See 50 FED. REG. 18,647 (1987) (a Federal
Communications Commission interpretation where "dedicated" was equated to
"designated" or "granted"); see also FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 598
(1981) (the Court stated that "[t]he construction of a statute by those charged with its
execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong
.... ) (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)).
Here, the FCC's interpretation of the word "dedicated" can only be wrong if a
court's position is that such a reading makes the Act unconstitutional by authorizing
a taking.
53. 991 F.2d at 1180.
54. While this comment is not intended to be an analysis on the benefits and
drawbacks of the forms of statutory interpretation, it would be error not to address
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easements already in place within an apartment building, despite
the fact that the court felt the language from the House committee
"clarifies that a cable television franchisee may use easements
dedicated for electric, gas or other utilities."55 In Wooley, the cable
operator sought to require the owner of two apartment buildings
to allow access to the premises in order to provide service to the
tenants.
The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress orig-
inally included but then discarded § 633.56 The proposed section
would have provided a franchised cable company with a right of
access to the interior of a multi-unit apartment house when ser-
vice was so requested by a tenant, even if the landowner objected
to the installation.57 Section 633(b)(1)(A), (B) and (C) were
adopted expressly into § 621 of the Act.58 Other provisions in
55. Cable Invs., Inc. v. Wooley, 867 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1989). It is odd that the
court concluded that a cable operator is permitted to use "compatible easements" such
as electric, gas and utilities without access also being provided to the interior of the
buildings and units, themselves, since these electric, gas and utility easements may
be private. The court seems to suggest that Congress intended, in an effort to
increase competition in the CATV industry and provide increased access to the
"information superhighway," to give the CATV operators only the ability to piggyback
solely existing "public" easements. I find it an impossible concept that the purpose of
the Act is served by this reading, for it would not matter if ten CATV operators gained
access to these easements without the ability to extend into individual units. There
would only be additional cables underground, providing no services to anyone. Again,
the reading of the Fifth Amendment is the crucible to understanding the Act, despite
Congressional ignorance. By avoiding the constitutional issue with the use of
legislative history, the court has merely affirmed Congress' mistakes.
56. Relying on Wooley's use of legislative history, the Media General court
observed that the "broad congressional purpose of the Cable Act was written before
the final passage of the Act. It was part of the original bill which contained § 633."
991 F.2d at 1173. However, the Media General court fails to employ the whole act
rule as part of its statutory interpretation. Under this rule of construction, the court
should look not merely to a particular clause, but take into account the entire statute.
Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974). This is because "a legislature passes
judgment upon the act as an entity, not giving one portion of the act any greater
authority than another." 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 47.02 (5th Ed., Norman Singer ed. 1992).
Thus, the force of the whole act rule is that all provisions enacted must be given
force. While the preamble is typically not given great weight by some courts where
the enacting provision is unambiguous, it "may be resorted to to help discover the
intention of the law maker..." where ambiguity exists, as is the case with the Cable
Act. Id. at § 47.04. Therefore, the stated purpose of the Act, found in the preamble
can be given weight to determine Congress' intent. Supra text accompanying note 6.
57. H.R. REP. No. 4103 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 633 (1984); H.R. REP. No. 943,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 79-81, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C-4-N. 4655, 4716-18.
58. The enacted sections stated:
(b)(1) A state or franchising authority may, and the [Federal
Communications] Commission shall, prescribe regulations which provide
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§ 633 were dropped prior to enactment.59
Congress, in what it described as a recognition of Loretto,
included subsection (d) in § 633 to provide just compensation for
the mandatory access into apartment complexes.60 The House
Committee Report stated that the ultimately unenacted subsec-
tion (d) of § 633 was created to provide for just compensation to
property owners and that the compensation mechanism had been
included "in order to comply with the constitutional requirements"
of Loretto.6 ' In Wooley, the court held that the absence of a
mandatory access provision, which appeared only in the original
§ 633 and not the final bill, is an indication of Congressional
intent not to provide access into individual dwellings through pri-
vate easements. 62 The court continued, noting that the Chairman
(A) that the safety, functioning, and appearance of the premises and
safety of other persons not be adversely affected by the
installation or construction of facilities necessary for a cable
system;
(B) that the cost of the installation, construction, operation, or
removal of such facilities be borne by the cable operator or
subscriber, or a combination of both;
(C) that the owner be justly compensated by the cable operator for any
damages caused by the installation, construction, operation, or
removal of such facilities by the cable operator....
Compare § 621(a)(2Xc) at 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2)(A)-(C) (1995).
59. The unenacted sections stated:
(d) In prescribing methods under subsection (b)(1)(D) for determining
just compensation, consideration shall be given to -
(1) the extent to which the cable system facilities occupy the premises;
(2) the actual long-term damage which the cable system facilities may
cause to the premises;
(3) the extent to which the cable system facilities would interfere with
the normal use and enjoyment of the premises; and
(4) the enhancement in value of the premises resulting from the
availability of services provided over the cable system.
H.R. REP. No. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 633 (1984), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 934,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13.
60. 130 CONG. REc. H10,444 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Fields).
61. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 80-81 reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.CA.N. 4655, 4717-18.
62. The court cited to Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983) which
holds "[Wihere Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but
deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not
intended." It also cited to Thompson v. Kennickell, 797 F.2d 1015, 1024-25 (D.C. Cir.
1986) where the court found the deletion of a provision to evidence congressional
intent.
Russello begs the question whether § 633(d) can truly be considered limiting
language, as it clearly expanded the cable operators access under the analysis
supplied by the Wooley court. Was the court correct in citing to this case? Contra
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S.Ct. 1562, 1567 (1993) where Justice Scalia stated, "Judge
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of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Congressman
Wirth, was disappointed in the failure of § 633. s3 However, a
reading of the statement indicates that Congressman Wirth was
disappointed in the consumer's inability to request cable services
because of the deletion of the multi-unit dwelling provision. He
does not state that a taking is precluded because of the deletion.
The court also noted that an opponent of the mandatory access
provision, Congressman Fields, stated that he was pleased with
the end result, for it removed a potential burden on property own-
ers to allow an entire apartment building to be wired at the
request of one tenant.64 Congressman Fields stated that he
agreed with the intent of the provision - to further expand the
reach of cable systems - but disagreed with the modus operandi of
this particular provision. Hopefully, the court did not find the
intent of Congress existed in the statement of an opponent to
§ 633 who explicitly agreed with the desired goal of the unenacted
provisions. Congressman Fields confirms that the intent was to
provide as much cable services as possible. His statement does
Harold Leventhal used to describe the use of legislative history as the equivalent of
entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's
friends." Isn't this what the court is doing here?
63. Rep. Wirth stated:
The purpose of [§ 633] was to ensure that all consumers including those
who reside in apartments and mobile home parks, had the opportunity to
receive cable service . . . . The provision prohibited landlords from
interfering with a consumer's ability to receive cable service - an
increasing troublesome problem whereby landlords become the ultimate
electronic editors, deciding to what sources of electronic information, if
any, a consumer shall have access.
A number of states have enacted laws to provide for citizen access so that
consumers would not be denied access to the increasing wealth of
programming and services available over cable television. I applaud
these efforts and, of course, the fact that a similar provision is no longer
part of [the bill] in no way effects the application of those state laws. I
hope my colleagues will join with me in the future to see to it that a
similar Federal provision is enacted.
16 CONG. REC. H10435 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth).
64. Rep. Fields stated:
I am particularly pleased with the version of the legislation before us
today which differs slightly from the bill reported from the Committee in
June .... Under [the mandatory access] provision, if one tenant in an
apartment building requested cable, a property owner would have been
forced to wire the entire building. Although I concur with the intent of
this provision, to make cable service available to the greatest number of
individuals, I believe this goal can be achieved in a better, more orderly
manner through a negotiated agreement between the cable operator and
the property owner, and not by legislative flat ....
16 CONG. REc. H10444 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Fields).
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not categorically deny access to any private easement, just those
in multi-unit dwellings. Section 633 would not have been applica-
ble where the private easement sought is one in a subdivision that
branches off of a public easement into an individual dwelling. In
such a case, Congressman Fields' statement would not be of any
significance, whatsoever.
The Wooley court stated that these floor statements constitute
"[F]urther evidence.., that the Cable Act as ultimately passed
encompasses some of the protections for property owners that the
deleted § 633 provided, but not those requiring just compensation
for takings."65 However, due to the political manueverings of lob-
byists and lawyers to persuade committee staff members and con-
gressional members, it is necessary to be suspicious of the both of
these floor statements.66 Still, the court surmised that:
Congress recognized that once it deleted the provision for
mandatory access to multiple unit dwellings, it need no
longer be concerned with the "taking" issue .... [W]e read
the requirement in section 621(a)(2)(C) that the owner be
'justly compensated' by the cable operator for any damages
to be unrelated to any takings issue.67
65. Cable Invs., Inc. v. Wooley, 867 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1989).
66. As duly noted by Justice Scalia:
[Ojly a small proportion of the Members of Congress read either one of
the Committee Reports [in question], even if the Reports happened to
have been published before the vote; that very few of those who did read
them set off for the nearest law library to check out what was actually
said in the [four] cases at issue .... As anyone familiar with modern-day
drafting of congressional committee reports is well aware, the references
to the cases were inserted, at best by a committee staff member on his or
her own initiative, and at worst by a committee staff member at the
suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purposes of those references was
not primarily to inform Members of Congress what the bill meant... but
rather to influence judicial construction. What a heady feeling it must be
for a young staffer, to know that his or her citation... can transform
them into the law of the land, thereafter dutifully to be observed by the
Supreme Court itself.
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989).
67. 867 F.2d at 158. But cf Greater Worcester Cablevision v. Carabetta Enter.,
682 F.Supp. 1244, 1259 (D. Mass. 1985) (The court felt that the final version of the Act
did, in fact, provide just compensation. It found that "the legislative history [of the
Act] explicitly refers to the Supreme Court's decision in Loretto." The courted further
noted that "§ 633 was drafted to comply with the constitutional requirement set forth
in that decision. Except for the provision detailing a method for determining what
constitutes just compensation, § 621(a)(2) fully incorporates the compensation
provisions of the unenacted § 633."); see also, Media General Cable of Fairfax, Inc. v.
Sequoyah Condo. Council of Co-Owners, 991 F.2d 1169, 1180 (3d Cir. 1993)
(Kaufman, J. dissenting) (Judge Kaufman adopted this interpretation of the
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Based on the legislative history as outlined above, the Wooley
court determined that it has construed the Act "to avoid the con-
stitutional issue that would be created were access mandated
without providing for just compensation to be made to the
owner."68 Here, it is clear that a proper reading of Loretto and the
Just Compensation Clause would severely diminish the weight
placed on legislative history by the Wooley court. In fact, a correct
reading of Loretto and subsequent application of the Just Compen-
sation Clause, despite Congress' beliefs regarding § 633, its sur-
rounding legislative history and the Wooley court's reliance on
these tools to avoid the takings issue, requires a court to apply the
law in conformance with Constitutional precedent and leave it to
Congress to amend the Act.
Furthermore, three and maybe four members of the Court
adhere, in some form, to Justice Scalia's New Textualism and thus
it would be error to discuss § 633 without indicating inherent
weaknesses in the use of legislative history in statutory interpre-
tation. This is especially true in a cases interpreting the Cable
Act where congressional misunderstanding of the Constitution
and Supreme Court precedent lends to drafting which does not
accomplish, necessarily, what Congress' stated purpose would
suggest.
Scalia and company would look only to the literal meaning of
§ 621(a)(2), as enacted, and any applicable Supreme Court prece-
dent to as their tools of statutory interpretation. This is not to
say, without exception, that the use of the legislative history is
without some merit in statutory interpretation.69 However, it can
not be denied that:
[T]he fact of the matter is that legislative history can be
cited to support almost any proposition, and frequently is.
The propensity for judges to look past statutory language is
well known to legislators. It creates strong incentives for
manipulating legislative history to achieve through the
courts results not achievable during the enactment process.
The potential for abuse is great.'
legislative history. His position comports with the fact that Congress did not
understand Loretto).
68. 867 F.2d at 159.
69. See Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 nA4 (1991),
where the entire Court, absent Scalia, found varied degrees of relevance from
legislative history in statutory interpretation.
70. Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring in the judgment.)
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As previously discussed, the self-executing nature of the
clause means that the absence of a just compensation provision
within a statute or ordinance does not mean that takings are not
authorized by the statute or that just compensation cannot be pro-
vided, i.e. that the statute is unconstitutional. Quite conversely,
just compensation is automatic once the taking has occurred and
if not provided by the legislature or the executive, the statute is
invalidated as unconstitutional v.7  Based on the predicate that the
Third Circuit misunderstood Loretto, it is easy to see that the use
of the unenacted § 633 accomplished the court's desire to limit
access provided by the Cable Act and avoid the constitutional tak-
ings issue. While Wooley clearly demonstrates that a provision
expressly providing access into apartment complexes was
dropped, the legislative history of the Act can never preclude or
preempt a correct application of the Constitution. Because Con-
gress clearly did not grasp takings law when drafting or enacting
the Act, Wooley's reliance on legislative history is misplaced.
Therefore, it is next necessary to look to the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, which avoids the takings issue as a matter of
jurisprudence, to further explain the deficiency in the circuits'
application of the Fifth Amendment. Notice that in all cases to
follow, the initial and most crucial flaw is the failure to under-
stand Loretto and the self-executing nature of the clause.
The Eleventh Circuit and the Canon to Avoid a
Constitutional Issue
While the Third Circuit's extensive analysis of the legislative
history has been a primary source for other courts' conclusion that
Congress did not intend to provide access to private easements,
the Eleventh Circuit has provided the most interesting interpreta-
tion of takings law. Primarily, from three lines of cases, this cir-
cuit has left its takings jurisprudence in disarray. 2 These case
will be analyzed chronologically so the misunderstandings of tak-
ings law can be traced more easily.
The issue of the scope of access provided by the Cable Act was
first addressed by the United States District Court in the North-
ern District of Georgia. This was the beginning of the Cable Hold-
71. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601 (1935).
72. The three lines of cases are Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate
Fund VI Ltd., 678 F.Supp. 871 (N.D. Ga. 1986), rev'd 953 F.2d 600 (11th Cir. 1992)
reh'g denied en banc 988 F.2d 1071 (11th Cir. 1993); Centel Cable Television Co. v.
Admiral's Cove Assoc. Ltd., 835 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1988); Centel Cable Television
Co. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905 (11th Cir. 1990).
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ings trilogy.7 3 The district court, after examining the legislative
history of the Act, concluded that "[Clongress intended § 621(a)(2)
to create the right of access; § 633 merely contained the standards
governing the exercise of that right."74 The court also stated that
if Congress did not provide for just compensation for the taking of
property that occurs when the CATV franchisee exercises its right
of access then § 621(a)(2) would be: (1) unconstitutional or (2) can-
not be found to grant access to private easements.75 Here, the
court determined that just compensation is provided by the Act
and that only the standards of what equals just compensation
were not transferred from § 633 to § 621; therefore, the Act was
deemed constitutional.
Next, the Eleventh Circuit heard Admiral's Cove on appeal.
The district court had found that Centel was not provided a pri-
vate right of action to install its cables in easements that had been
platted for telephone and electric utilities. Writing for the court,
Judge Fay held that (1) the cable operator was authorized to
access easements dedicated for compatible uses, not limited to
"public" easements76 , and (2) that a cause of action for CATV oper-
ators was created by the Act. 7 Most importantly, the court noted
that "Congress intended the Cable Act to provide uniformity ....
We do not believe that Congress intended that the cable industry
73. In that case, the cable operator claimed that the Act provided a right of
access to serve tenants in two apartment complexes through compatible utility
easements. The landowner stated that the right of access was limited and could not
be exercised over a landowner's objection. The landowner asserted that the operators
were limited to public rights of way and publicly-dedicated easements and that access
to private easements would violate the owner's constitutional rights.
74. 678 F.Supp. at 873. But cf Wooley, 867 F.2d at 158 where the court held:
[T]he deletion of § 633 in the final version of the Cable Act, the transfer of
some of its provisions to § 541 but not those provisions detailing the
factors to be considered in arriving at just compensation for a taking, the
deletion of any reference to multi-unit buildings, and the statements of
the congressmen approving and decrying the deletion of § 633 lead
ineluctably to the conclusion that Congress made a considered decision
that the Cable Act should not give cable operators the right to impose
their service on owners of multi-unit dwellings who choose not to use
them.
75. 678 F.Supp. at 873. Unfortunately, this indicates that the district court did
not properly address the takings issue.
76. Based on the legislative history of the Act, Judge Fay held that the language
"[easements] which have been dedicated for compatible uses . . ." indicated
Congressional authorization for cable operators to "piggyback" on easements
"dedicated for electric, gas or utility transmission .... " 835 F.2d at 1361 n-5.
77. The issue of a CATV operator's right of access to courts is not being treated
in this comment, however, Judge Fay's determination that Congress would more
likely place the right to sue property owners with the CATV operators is logical.
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insure its growth by relying on state access laws when the major-
ity of states had not passed such laws."7" The case was subse-
quently remanded for further proceedings. Admiral's Cove's
holding primarily addressed the issue of a right of action for cable
operators under the Act and hence, the footnote that stated cable
operators were allowed to "piggyback" private easements was
ignored as dicta in the next case before the circuit.
Thus, in White, where the court was faced with the issue of a
landowner denying access to a CATV operator to easements which
had been granted to Florida Power and Light and Southern Bell,
the court found that prohibition of such access is a private agree-
ment in violation of the Act.79 The developer argued that the Act,
as interpreted by the Admiral's Cove court, violated the Takings
Clause by providing access to "private" easements.8 0 The panel
rejected this argument based on Admiral's Cove.81 In a concur-
ring opinion Judge Henley, sitting by designation from the Eighth
Circuit, expressed concern over Admiral's Cove handling of the
constitutional issue. While Judge Henley agreed that the Act pro-
vided CATV operators an implied right of action against develop-
ers who restricted their access to "easements dedicated for
compatible uses" he noted "that enforcement of this right does not
violate the Fifth Amendment." 2
Judge Henley's concern regarding the circuit's treatment of
the takings issue is well-founded. Admiral's Cove relied on FCC v.
Florida Power Corp.8 3 The Admiral's Cove court relied on Florida
78. 835 F.2d at 1362 citing 130 CONG. REC. S14,283 (daily ed. Oct. 11 1984)
(statement of Sen. Goldwater); 130 CONG. 1Ec. H10,435 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984)
(statement of Rep. Wirth).
79. Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905, 908
(11th Cir. 1990). Under United States v. Machado, 804 F.2d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir.
1986) the circuit is bound by the decisions of prior panels until they are modified en
banc. Thus, the White court was also bound by the determinations of the Admiral's
Cove court when it addressed the constitutionality of the Act.
80. The Admiral's Cove panel stated that Congress may force the developer to
allow a cable operator to use utility easements without offending the Fifth
Amendment when the developers voluntarily grants easements for utility use. The
court noted that "once an easement is established for utilities it is well within the
authority of Congress to include cable television as a user." 835 F.2d at 1362 n.7.
81. 902 F.2d at 909.
82. Id. at 910.
83. 480 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1987) where the Supreme Court, reversing the
Eleventh Circuit, held that the Pole Attachments Act, 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1988), did not
create a taking under the Filth Amendment because "[n]othing in the Pole
Attachments Act... gives cable companies any right to occupy space on utility poles,
or prohibits utility companies from refusing to enter into attachment agreements with
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Power to hold that since developers made voluntary easement
grants for "compatible uses", Congress could force the developer to
allow CATV access to those easements without a constitutional
violation. Judge Henley properly noted that reliance on this case
is incorrect because in Florida Power the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the Pole Attachments Act did not require pole owners,
such as utilities, to allow installation of TV cables on the poles and
thus no takings issue developed. 4 Instead, the Court found that
since the pole owners had voluntarily permitted physical occupa-
tion, the regulation was not the kind of taking as in Loretto. 5
Here, the landowners are not voluntarily permitting access to the
CATV operators so Florida Power is inapplicable.
Cable Holdings came on appeal to the circuit two years after
White had been decided. The circuit court reversed the district
court's finding that the Act provided access to the interior of an
apartment house's wall through the use of private easements
granted to the telephone company, electric company and compet-
ing video programming operator.86 First, the court stated it would
not accept the district court's interpretation of § 621(a) because
the district court erred by not applying the canon of statutory con-
struction that requires courts to avoid constitutional issues.87 The
court stated that "Congress does not have the constitutional power
to authorize a physical occupation of an owner's property ... even
84. 480 U.S. at 251.
85. Id. at 252-53.
Next, Judge Henley made the distinction between the factual scenario of whether
the easements in White had been granted before or after the enactment of the Cable
Act. He stated that if they were prior to enactment, the facts are analogous to Loretto
and if subsequent, then the Act really works as a condition on future development.
The latter situation, Judge Henley urged, would be analogous to Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), where a state land use commission
conditioned the building permit for a beach bungalow on the granting of a public
easement to pass along beachfront property. 902 F.2d at 911.
In Nollan, the Court found that the commission could not place such a condition
on development within any legitimate exercise of their power and that if they desired
the public easement they were required to engage in eminent domain proceedings and
pay just compensation. I do not find that situation factually analogous to the
situations which arise under the Cable Act. Clearly, Congress does have regulatory
authority over the cable industry. That is why the decisions address the issue of
congressional intent. Nollan was an unconstitutional taking because of the manner
in which the easement was obtained - as a condition on development by an agency
which lacked such authority. Even an easement created subsequent to the Act would
still amount to a permanent physical taking and thus Loretto would continue to
control.
86. Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI Ltd., 953 F.2d
600, 601 (11th Cir. 1992).
87. Id at 602.
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when a property owner has privately allowed other occupations
which are 'compatible' with a government sanctioned invasion.""8
In an attempt to avoid a constitutional issue, the court fathomed
the rule that "§ 621(a)(2) authorizes a franchised cable company's
access to easements on private property only when the private
property owner has dedicated those easements for the general use
of any utilities."89 Finally, the court stated that the Act does not
afford the operator the right to access and occupy the developer's
private apartment buildings.90 Critical errors are committed in
the court's discussion of Loretto. In a span of one page, the court




The district court, in fact, had not stated that the CATV operator could occupy
any area of the owner's building. The court stated, "[To the extent that [Cable
Holding's] system does not completely follow [does not 'piggybackI rights-of-way or
easements, [they] are not properly exercising [their] rights of access. The court will
allow [Cable Holdings] 90 days to remove those sections of its system.., that do not
piggyback compatible easements." 678 F.Supp. at 874.
This begs the question of whether the Eleventh Circuit limited access to "public"
easements in a reaction to what it thought was the lower court decision providing
access to and allowing occupation of "private apartment buildings."
91. The court acknowledged that the New York law amounted to a permanent
physical occupation authorized by government and that such a taking required just
compensation- It even acknowledged that the Court remanded the case for a
determination on the amount of compensation due. Then it stated, in declining to
address the takings issue, that if § 621(a) authorizes an occupation of compatible
easements the court "would have substantial reservations regarding the
constitutionality of the Cable Act .... Mhe district court's construction of§ 621(a)(2)
effectively permits exactly the same occupation found impermissible in Loretto ....
953 F.2d at 604.
Another major argument the court made was that providing access to private
easements violates an owner's right to exclude. The court correctly noted that "when
the government appropriates an owner's right to exclude another's physical presence
without paying the owner just compensation, the government violates the Takings
Clause." Id. The court surmised that the takings issue thus created is whether the
government may appropriate the right to exclude whenever the owner "selectively
relinquishes that right by permitting a compatible occupation." Id. However, in
Kaiser Aetna, the marina selectively relinquished its right to exclusion at the charge
of $72 per individual who desired to purchase a membership to the marina. There,
the Court held that the government had the power to turn the marina public, so long
as compensation was provided to the marina owners despite the fact that in so doing,
the government was intruding on the landowners right to exclude. Kaiser Aetna v.
United States 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
Thus, the House Report providing that "[alny private arrangements which seek
to restrict a cable system's use of such easements or rights-of-way which have been
granted to other utilities are in violation of this section and not enforceable. .. ." is
further illustration that the Act contemplates a taking, even in the sense of a Kaiser
Aetna government intrusion on the right to exclude. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 80-81 reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C-A.N. 4655, 4696.
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Just over a year later, the circuit denied rehearing Cable
Holdings en banc. In a scorching dissent, Chief Judge Tjoflat
addressed many of the issues discussed above and emphasized
that the Fifth Amendment is self-executing. As stated by Chief
Judge Tjoflat:
The panel, by proceeding as if the clause is not self-execut-
ing, has established a rule with far-reaching implications.
According to the panel - and apparently now a settled mat-
ter in this circuit - state and federal statutes that operate
to take private property but which do not explicitly provide
for just compensation are unconstitutional. This approach
abrogates in this circuit Supreme Court precedent holding
that the Just Compensation Clause is self-executing and,
therefore, legislation need not explicitly provide for just com-
pensation in order to be constitutional.9 2
Chief Judge Tjoflat exhibits a thorough understanding of takings
law and properly notes that the Act need not expressly provide for
just compensation. His urging to rehear the takings issue should
be followed by the circuit because, currently, its takings law is in
disarray.
Back to the Fourth Circuit: the Courts' Interdependence
In addition to its plain meaning interpretation, the Fourth
Circuit, in Media General, relied almost exclusively on the opin-
ions of the Third and Eleventh Circuits in determining that the
Act does not permit a CATV operator to compel access to private
Finally, the court looked to Nollan when asking the hypothetical "[C]ould the
government [instead] legislate that if the beachfront owner allowed his neighbors to
cross his beach, he must allow the public at large to cross?" Again, in Nollan, the
Court held that the lack of a nexus between the condition imposed and the original
purpose in the building restriction converts the purpose into the obtaining of an
easement to serve a governmental purpose but without just compensation paid.
Therefore, the Court found that if the state wanted an easement across the property,
it could exercise its eminent domain power and pay for it. Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 844 (1987). Clearly, Congress need not authorize
the kind of taking proposed in the hypothetical. Congress may simply authorize a
taking, and any taking will require just compensation or invalidation.
92. 988 F.2d at 1071. Supra pp. 11-16 for an in-depth discussion of the self-
executing nature of the Takings Clause.
Chief Judge Tjoflat's second reason for requesting a hearing en banc was to
address "erroneous interpretations" of the facts in Admiral's Cove and White. Chief
Judge Tjoflat suggests that a proper reading of the circuit's precedent would have
compelled a different result in Cable Holdings. Although breifly alluded to
previously, a detailed discussion of this issue is not necessary for the purpose of this
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utility easements in order to reach individual unit owners, author-
ize a taking of private property, or provide just compensation for
such a taking. Again, the court stated that Media's access was
limited solely to "easements and rights-of-way dedicated for public
use."93 What is more troubling, however, is the Fourth Circuit's
reliance on Cable Holdings. The Fourth Circuit specifically stated
that it wished to reserve the takings question "for another day and
another set of facts."94 It accomplished this goal by citing with
approval to a section in Cable Holdings which stated:
If § 621(a)(2) authorized [the cable franchisee] to construct
its cable system on McNeil's private property regardless of
the presence of any compatible easements, we would have
little difficulty in finding the provision in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. After all, under such facts § 621(a)(2)
would be indistinguishable from the New York statute ana-
lyzed [and declared unconstitutional] in Loretto.. .9
Clearly, the reliance on this passage indicates that the majority
does not properly understand Loretto. In dissent, however, Judge
Kaufman skillfully illustrates the correct holding of Loretto and
its application to the Act. Judge Kaufman is of the view that the
Act does in fact provide CATV operators with access to private
easements.96 Judge Kaufman noted that Loretto is factually dis-
tinguishable from any case arising under the Cable Act because
the statute in Loretto did not limit a CATV operator's access to
easements, but gave the right to occupy any part of the property.
However, Judge Kaufman correctly notes that for the purposes of
taking law, this difference is inconsequential. 97 The fact that the
Loretto statute provided for access to any of the property reason-
ably required for use adds even more credence to the view that the
majority is misreading the clause. This is because the Act limits
access to easements and public rights-of-way, an area far more
limited than that of the Loretto statute. Judge Kaufman correctly
stated that construing the Act as enacted so as to require just
93. The legislative history argument will not be discussed again. However, it is
important to note that the same misreading of Loretto helps affirm the use of such
history. Clearly, the history would be valuable if Congress and the courts were not
misapplying the Constitution, but as previously stated, legislative history cannot
provide a conclusive basis for an opinion in these cases because the Constitution is
being misread.
94. Media General Cable of Fairfax, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condo. Council of Co-
Owners, 991 F.2d 1169, 1175 (4th Cir. 1993).
95. Id. at 1175 (quoting Cable Holdings, 953 F.2d at 604) (alteration in original).
96. Supra pp. 16-22 for a discussion on a textual interpretation of the Act.
97. 991 F.2d at 1180.
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compensation for a taking allows CATV operators to provide serv-
ices via private easements and that such a reading of the Act
avoids any constitutional problem.9" Again, as did the majority in
Wooley, the court here addressed a takings issue it sought to avoid
and resolved it improperly.
CONCLUSION
It is important that we came full circle back to Media General
because this case illustrates the tendency of the circuits to rely on
the decisions of other circuits when cases of first impression
arise.99 Still, there are circuits which have not addressed the
issue discussed above and, hopefully, they will pause to read this
comment which encourages a proper reading of Loretto and the
Just Compensation Clause. Failure to do so will surely convolute
the purpose of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, just as it has
frustrated competition in the cable television industry. Courts
considering the scope of access issue presented by the Act should
find the Act unconstitutional after addressing the takings issue
rather than blindly follow the obstacle course that has haphaz-
ardly been laid before them. This would at least entitle Congress
another bite at the apple and at worst prevent additional confu-
sion of the issue. The use of the canon to avoid constitutional
issues should be employed with caution. As the Supreme Court
stated, "[Tihe fact that courts should not decide constitutional
issues unnecessarily does not permit a court to press statutory
construction 'to the point of disingenuous evasion' to avoid a con-
stitutional question."100 Instead of invoking the canon, I urge
courts to recognize the self-executing nature of the clause, allow
for invalidation as a remedy, give each provision in § 621(a)(2)
equal weight and then rule. The correct ruling would seem to
allow the operators access to private easements of "compatible
uses." However, if a court does not find the same, invalidation -
after addressing the constitutional issue - would at least provide
Congress another chance to get it right.
98. Id. at 1181.
99. See Century Southwest Cable TV, Inc. v. CIIF Assocs., 33 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir.
1994); TCI of N. D., Inc. v. Schriock Holding Co., 11 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1993). Both of
these cases rely on the techniques of the cases discussed in this comment and cite to
the cases approvingly.
100. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985) (quoting United States v. Locke,
471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985)).
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